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Professor Clark's paper is surely the most self-consciously scientific
of those delivered at the symposium. In aspiration it resembles the
work of Professor Posner,1 who is famous for his contributions to the
scientific study of the legal system. The approach of these scholars
exemplifies a growing adoption of the scientific style in legal scholar-
ship. Although social scientists have occasionally addressed subjects
relating to the law, their interest in the legal system typically has been
tangential. In contrast, this modem legal scholarship boldly attempts
a comprehensive examination of the institutions of the law with the
methods of the sciences. Most prominent is the work of what is now
a substantial group of scholars, led by Professor Posner, who contend
that the universe of common law rules exhibits a single scientific regu-
larity: the rules are, in the terms of economics, efficient. Professor
Clark's charge to us is equally ambitious. He would have us examine
the development over time of all legal doctrines in terms of the bio-
logical process of evolution.
The attraction of the scientific method, of course, is the seeming
precision and power that it brings to analysis of the legal system.
Scientific propositions, as Professor Clark frequently informs us, are
"testable." 2 They can be confirmed or refuted, unlike the invocation
of (often personal) values that is characteristic of ordinary legal schol-
arship. Science offers the legal world the possibility of consensus once
"general laws of [legal] change"3 are discovered.
In this Comment I argue that the contribution of this modem
work to our understanding of the legal system is greatly exaggerated.
A very large proportion of this work is scientistic and, in essence,
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
I wish to thank Kenneth I. Wolpin and Stuart Bauchner for helpful comments and
other assistance. I am responsible for errors.
1. Professor Posner alludes to this work in his symposium piece. See Posner, The
Present Situation in Legal Scholarshib, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1119-21 (1981).
2. E.g., Clark, The InterdiscipTlinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1258-
59 (1981).
3. Id. at 1260.
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alien to the sciences from which it seems to derive. More generally, I
believe, the aim to construct a comprehensive theory of legal doc-
trines-whether economic or biological-represents, in our present state
of knowledge, a perversion of the scientific enterprise. In this respect,
the scientific methods of Professors Clark and Posner are similar and
bear closer examination.
I. Clark's Scientific Method
Let us first review the method of Professor Clark, which derives
from biology and compares change in legal institutions to the bio-
logical process of evolution. According to Clark's method, a scholar
first must immerse himself in a field of law and progressively distill
the large and detailed mass of legal rules until a small and manage-
able number of central features remains. In this manner, Clark him-
self has identified the four principles of corporation law, the seven
postulates of corporate income tax, the four stages of capitalist en-
terprise, the five phases of corporate reorganization, and the five
stages of remedies for creditors of businesses. 4 Each of these phases
or stages is an archetypical form, representing a distinct point in the
development of the field. Clark calls them "starting points," but
they are at once end-points of one line of development and starting
points of another, in the manner of a chain of development over time.
In the second step of Clark's method, the scholar inquires how the
identified stages differ from each other. Once the relevant differences
are made clear, the scholar specifies the principles of development
from stage to stage; that is, both the "motor" of change5 and the
environmental conditions that have influenced the rate or direction
of the trend. As a final step, the scholar attempts to tie together the
explanations of the trends of development between the various stages.
With luck, it is possible to devise a comprehensive explanation-an
explanation of the trend between stage one and stage two that is con-
sistent with the explanations of the trends between stages two and
three, three and four, and so on. It is at this point, according to Clark,
"where the hard work comes in, and where the methodology of the
social sciences may be of use."6 Clark advises us to examine the various
social sciences to find which of them-economics, sociology, psychology,
for example-most clearly illuminates the particular data under study.7
4. For synopses of Clark's studies, see id. at 1245-56.
5. Id. at 1257.
6. Id. at 1258.
7. Id. at 1260.65.
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Clark admits that it is not always possible to discover a single ex-
planation for the various changes from stage to stage. Thus, Clark
explains that four of the five phases of corporate reorganization-al-
though not all five-develop from "a need for more numerous or
exacting valuation procedures." Furthermore, sometimes there are
multiple rather than single determinants of specific trends in the law
whose influence is likely to be difficult to disaggregate. For example,
Clark finds the four principles of corporation law to have derived
from "technological changes... [that made] large-scale industries ...
feasible," plus an increase in the "general level of wealth," which
remained "not extremely lopsided in distribution," plus, finally, the
acceptance of "private ownership of capital goods ... as a social and
legal norm."9
Nevertheless, Clark's own work seems to show that reasonably sim-
ple and straightforward explanations can be discovered for develop-
ments in what appear to be very complex fields. Indeed, on the basis
of these several studies, Clark is able to transcend specific discoveries
to identify evolutionary principles of even greater generality. In five
of the six areas of the law Clark gives as examples, the stages and
trends illustrate a general law of "primary cost reduction," the re-
duction by institutional design of costs of imperfect information, risk,
and uncertainty (that is, transaction costs).' 0 Furthermore, Clark finds
that once a principal institutional stage has been strongly established,
there occurs what he calls "secondary cost reduction": the "lengthy,
complex efflorescence of doctrinal detail" to elaborate and refine the
particular central institutional form.1 Secondary cost reduction oc-
occurs in response to the continual effort of affected parties "pushing
to modify the legal landscape in a direction favorable to [their]
interests." 
2
Clark has discovered, however, one exception to the general laws
of primary and secondary cost reduction. The field of corporate taxa-
tion exhibits a different form of evolution. The seven starting points
of corporate taxation derive not from cost reduction but, echoing
Malthus and Darwin, from the "continued struggle among opposing
groups over externally fixed resources."' 3 As a consequence, Clark
8. Id. at 1250.
9. Id. at 1243.
10. Id. at 1241-42.
11. id. at 1242.
12. Id. at 1247.
13. Id. at 1256.
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observes evolution toward "cumulative complexity of legal rules with-
out any offsetting social efficiencies."
14
II. Posner's Scientific Method
Now let us examine Professor Posner's method for the study of his
hypothesis that common law rules are efficient. 15 Some critics have
alleged that Professor Posner's efficiency hypothesis derives from his
political views or interests. From the standpoint of scientific evalua-
tion, however, Professor Posner's personal views are irrelevant. In-
deed, whether or not Professor Posner can defend himself against this
accusation, critics of his. theory are obliged to consider the best scien-
tific case that can be made for his hypothesis.
Strictly stated, Posner's hypothesis is that common law principles
serve to optimize the sum of costs and benefits for parties subject to
them.106 Why common law principles possess this characteristic is not
known, but the proposition nonetheless provides a means for deduc-
ing specific and observable outcomes. The hypothesis is tested by
surveying leading decisions of a variety of unrelated fields to deter-
mine whether the legal rules embodied in the decisions are efficient.
A serious weakness of this method of evaluation is that information
about costs and benefits is drawn solely from appellate opinions. Be-
cause the "economic logic" of the common law is implicit rather than
explicit, 17 appellate opinions seldom contain estimates of costs and
benefits sufficiently precise for careful confirmation of the hypothesis,
a problem that is particularly acute where legal principles of sub-
stantial generality are at issue. This weakness, however, is regarded
chiefly as a problem of measurement rather than of theory. Further-
more, the problem of measuring the efficiency of specific rules be-
comes less significant where support for the hypothesis is cumulative.
Thus, it is important to the credibility of the theory that evidence in
its favor can be found in an extraordinary variety of what otherwise
appear to be unrelated or loosely related legal fields. In addition, cu-
14. Id.
15. The theories of Professors Clark and Posner are similar in respects besides meth-
od. Posner's efficiency-of-the-law hypothesis is only a more rigorous form of Clark's "pri-
mary" and "secondary" laws of change. Clark, at various points, hedges his hypothesis
by incorporating concerns about the distribution of wealth and "social or legal norms"
as determinants of change. Because those determinants cannot be measured, however,
the seemingly greater breadth of Clark's theory is not an advantage. For a related criti-
cism of Professor Clark's theory, see p. 1290 infra.
16. See R. PosNE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Passim (2d ed. 1977).
17. See id. at 179, 181; Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 22 (1960).
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mulative support for the hypothesis diminishes concern over the failure
to identify a mechanism generating efficient rules. If one finds con-
firming evidence of the efficiency hypothesis in fields as diverse as
rescue law, corporation law, and First Amendment law, one has dis-
covered a scientific proposition-like the laws of gravity or the pre-
Mendelian process of natural selection-of substantial generality and
importance, even if the precise mechanism of its operation is unclear.
III. The Scientific Methods of Clark and Posner Compared
How are the scientific methods of Clark and Posner similar, and
what does the similarity tell us about the modern scientific study of
the legal system? Both scholars attempt to apply to law the rigorous
methods of established sciences: one calls on biology, and the other,
economics. The more significant and curious similarity is that the
methods of scientific inquiry applied by Clark and Posner have been
abandoned by practicing scientists in the fields of biology and eco-
nomics. Both Clark and Posner bring to the study of the legal sys-
tem scientific methods discredited in the sciences from which their
analyses derive.
Professor Clark, for example, borrows from biology a very primi-
tive theory of evolutionary change. His method of analysis most close-
ly resembles the form of typological study characteristic of biology
in the late eighteenth century, when scientific endeavor focused on
the identification of ideal types and of differences between these
types."' There is less stasis in the world of Professor Clark than in
eighteenth-century natural science, but an idea common to both is
that evolution proceeds in steps or jumps between distinct and unique
stages.19 Clark's general law of secondary cost reduction borrows from
a different biological tradition. Secondary cost reduction closely re-
sembles Lamarckism: the theory that the constant and repeated use
of characteristics of some type (Lamarck's organs or Clark's legal rules),
accompanied by efforts of organisms or individuals to make the most
of the characteristics in their respective environments, strengthens and
enlarges the characteristics. 20 Thus the expanding neck of Lamarck's
giraffe and the detailed "efflorescence" of Clark's rules.21
18. See A. LovEjoY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING 251-52 (1936); E. MAYR, Typological
versus Population Thinking, in EVOLUTION AND THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 26 (1976).
19. There appeals also, in both conceptions, a sense of ever-increasing progress. See,
e.g., C. GILLISPIE, GENESIS AND GEOLOGY 204 (1951); A LovEJoY, supra note 18, at 242-62.
20. See E. MAYR, Lanarck Revisited, in EVOLUTION AND THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 222 (1976).
21. The comparison of Clark to Lamarck is accurate, but somewhat unfair. Lamarck's
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My point is not to challenge Professor Clark's theory of evolution,
but to note the curious nature of his application of biological method.
Clark ignores methodological advances in biology that are responsible
for many of its modem achievements and that would have informed
and substantially enriched his study of legal phenomena.
The principal methodological advance of nineteenth-century natural
science was the idea of uniformitarianism, which proposes that natural
forces operating in the past are similar to forces operating in the
present.22 The implication of the uniformitarian approach is to ren-
der illusory the theory of stages or phases that are in any meaningful
way distinct. The only changes that occur are those that can be ob-
served each day-small changes, perhaps imperceptible at the level of
the single observation.
Uniformitarianism transformed the study of biology, not because
it more accurately estimated the true specific rate of natural change,
but because it is methodologically superior to both typological and
catastrophic approaches. The uniformitarian proposition vastly in-
creases the number and range of observations available to confirm or
refute a specific hypothesis. 23 The uniformitarian approach would
greatly ease the labor of testing Clark's theories. Professor Clark, pre-
sumably, would test his corporation law hypothesis by a tedious and
extremely problematic collection of data on the size and distribution
of wealth over the last two hundred years. 24 Compare the method of
the uniformitarian, who would test the hypothesis by observing the
relationship between corporation law and the distribution of wealth
at some specific time-today or at any other period for which data
are available.
The uniformitarian approach was instrumental in the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries in the supercession of the Baconian induc-
tive method of science by the modem hypothetico-deductive method.
Professor Clark's scientific method for the study of the law is essen-
tially inductive. According to Clark, the scholar collects data rele-
vant to some legal field with few if any preconceived ideas, and studies
damaged reputation as an evolutionary theorist stems from his failure to explain the trans-
mittal to subsequent generations of characteristics developed by use or disuse. The mech-
anism of transmittal of legal characteristics in Clark's theory is much more plausible.
22. See M. GHISELIN, THE TRIUMPH OF THE DARWINIAN METHOD 13-18 (1969); C.
GILLISPIE, suira note 19, at 121-48; E. MAYR, The Nature of the Darwinian Revolution,
in EVOLUTION AND THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 277 (1976); Rudwick, Uniformity and Progression:
Reflections on the Structure of Geological Theory in the Age of Lyell, in PERSPEcTIVEs
IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 209 (D. Roller ed. 1971).
23. See M. GHISELIN, suPra note 22, at 14.
24. Clark, suPra note 2, at 1242-47.
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the data with the objective of defining broader and broader gen-
eralizations about the field.25 This approach is very similar to Bacon's
method-now, of course, discredited--of induction by exclusion: of
progressing from observations of the lowest universals to axioms of
the greatest generality. 26
Although the Baconian method was responsible for substantial scien-
tific advance, it was recognized in the nineteenth century that the
method of investigation was basically ad hoc and inclined toward
tautology.27 Professor Clark emphasizes the testing of hypotheses in
order to avoid tautology. But the ad hoc character of his method is
evident, in particular, in his acceptance of partial explanations of
his data. As mentioned earlier, Clark is satisfied if, say, four of five
legal stages can be explained according to one theory with the fifth
stage explained according to a different theory,28 a failing common
to the Baconian inductive approach. Applied rigorously, the unifor-
mitarian proposition would not allow partial explanations of this
nature.
Professor Posner's application of economics to the legal system, in
contrast, is in no respect inductive. Posner formulates a hypothesis
that he proceeds to test by the examination of fresh evidence. Pro-
fessor Posner's specific hypothesis, however, is as peculiar and as for-
eign to positive economics as Clark's application of evolutionary ideas
is to biology. Indeed, Posner's efficiency-of-the-law hypothesis has no
relation to positive economics as we know it. The efficiency hypothe-
sis alludes to economics; the determinants of rules are costs and bene-
fits. But the science of economics, as Professor Posner has taught us,
is the science of constrained choice, of equilibria subject to cost con-
straints. In Professor Posner's model, however, there is no individual
25. See D. HULL, DARWIN AND His CRics 9 (1975).
26. See F. BACON, THE NEW ORGANON 129-52 (F. Anderson ed. 1960) (lst ed. 1620)
(aphorisms 9-16 of Book II); D. HuLL, supra note 25, at 21.
Professor Clark's criticism of one of my papers, see Clark, supra note 2, at 1266-72, re-
sembles the classic debate between inductive and deductive scientists. See D. HuLL, supra
note 25, at 9. Clark criticizes my theory as empirically meaningless. Similarly, the most
common objection by inductivists to Darwin's (deductive) theory was that it rested on
hypotheses relating to unobservable and unknowable phenomena. Id. at 33. The principal
grounds of disagreement, however, are scientific method and the nature of acceptable
proof. In my view, my theory of the selection of efficient rules can be tested and would
be supported by a demonstration that cases in which the stakes to the parties are higher
are litigated more frequently. Such a demonstration would be similar to the support of-
fered to the theory of natural selection by evidence of differential rates of reproductive
success.
27. See M. GHtSELIN, supra note 22, at 39-40.
28. See p. 1286 suPra. In this respect, Professor Clark's theory resembles saltatory
theories of evolution.
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maximizing behavior, there is no mechanism for the equilibration
of individual decisions (no market), there is no conception of the
margin or of marginal changes in behavior in response to marginal
changes in costs. Posner's model shares none of the defining charac-
teristics of positive economics.
Professor Posner and others have attempted to discover how costs
might constrain the judicial choice among legal rules. Thus, they have
studied advancement patterns in the judiciary as a function of the
frequency of citation or of affirmance-reversal rates. 29 But these at-
tempts seem half-hearted, and understandably so: their results have
failed to confirm the hypothesis.
From the standpoint of positive economics, the peculiar aspect of
Professor Posner's work is his discovery of efficiency in the complete
absence of individual maximizing decisions. In the world of Professor
Posner, the society somehow devises perfectly cost-optimizing legal
rules. Studies in positive economics, in contrast, never discover or
even attempt to discover "efficiency." Such studies are fortunate if
the direction of a change in behavior can be specified and observed
unambiguously. The efficiency concept is employed in other forms
of economic work: efforts to devise models describing the characteris-
tics of optimal institutions or regimes. The function of these economic
studies, however, is chiefly normative. They inform the utilitarian
policymaker of optimal decisions.
Professor Posner, however, has turned this style of economics on
its head; that is why there has been so much confusion about the
normative or positive basis of his work.30 Posner's method is that of
normative economics steadfastly employed toward positive ends, a posi-
tive theory of social values3 ' rather than of social behavior. The char-
acter of Posner's work thus is alien to both positive and normative
economics and has no analogue among the work of practicing econ-
omists.3
2
In my view, however, Professor Posner's departure from the normal
method of economics is more that a curious eccentricity. Posner's
hypothesis and his work attempting to support it are in essence anti-
29. Higgins & Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1980); Landes & Posner,
Legal Change, Judicial Behavoir, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367
(1980).
30. See, e.g., Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. Rav. 483, 485 (1974).
31. As a theory of values, Posner's is a simple theory with a very simply defined ju-
dicial utility function.
32. Posner's method resembles that of the famous article by Gary Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968), although Becker admits
that his objective is normative, id. at 169-70.
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thetical to the economic theory of behavior. If Posner were correct
that all legal rules or principles are efficient, he would have discovered
the single most powerful empirical contradiction of all time of the
economic theory of behavior, of far more significance than the work
of Kennedy,33 Kelman,34 or Twersky and Kahneman 35 in their oblique
challenge to the behavioral assumptions of economics. Posner's find-
ing, if correct, would subvert positive economics because it would
demonstrate that in a significant area of human behavior, an economic
equilibrium can result without any of the prerequisites of equilibrium:
without individual maximizing decisions, without even the existence
of a market or of a shadow market. Such a finding would challenge
every empirical result consistent with the theory of individual be-
havior in markets because it would provide evidence that individual
behavior is irrelevant to equilibrium. The market itself may be an
epiphenomenon.
IV. The Modem Scientific Study of the Law
My purpose in these comments is not to criticize the substance of
Clark's or Posner's theories, but to illustrate a central problem that
accompanies the introduction of the scientific method into legal dis-
course. We must ask how we can explain the peculiar application of
scientific methods by these two scholars. It is an important question
because of the very high abilities of both of them. Clark and Posner
are probably the two most prolific scholars of the day; they are also
the two with the widest range of expertise and interest. Why is their
science so inadequate, and what does their example portend for
what I have called the rise of "scientism" in legal scholarship?
The answer, I believe, is that both Clark and Posner are lawyers
whose principal interest is legal phenomena. The method of both
scholars is to employ scientific theory, but only as a tool to illuminate
the legal system that is their particular focus of interest. This method
is much different from that of an economist or biologist. The eco-
nomic theorist is interested principally in defining the characteristics
33. Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 387 (1981).
34. Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979); Kelman, Spitzer and Hoffman on Coase: A Brief
Rejoinder, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1215 (1980); M. Kelman, Unpublished discussion notes for
Yale Law School Legal Theory workshop (Oct. 11, 1979).
35. Twersky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 Sci. 453 (1981).
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of economic behavior. Some hypothesis with respect to economic be-
havior may lead the economist to the law if the legal example is par-
ticularly revealing or the legal data particularly rich. But the econo-
mist has no interest in explaining law in any comprehensive way or
in explaining the law at all, except perhaps as a by-product of the
economic investigation. That is why in most studies of legal phenom-
ena by economists, the explanation of law, as opposed to the expla-
nation of behavior, appears to lawyers hopelessly incomplete and naive.
Science as typically practiced in law schools is much different. It
is the law that is to be explained, with whatever scientific techniques
are available. In his oral remarks at the symposium, Professor Clark
urged us to be "opportunistic," "to raid the social sciences for what-
ever theories are of value."36 Similarly, Professor Posner has answered
the criticism that his theory ignores individual maximizing behavior
by recounting the diverse areas of law that the theory explains. These
methods, however, represent a form of corruption of the scientific
process that is insufficiently emphasized in considerations of law and
the social (or natural) sciences. In bringing a scientific theory to a
specific phenomenon, one loses sight of the tentative and exploratory
nature of scientific propositions. Seldom does such a study show more
than that the legal data are not inconsistent with tome scientific theory.
The study of law and the social sciences seldom contributes to the
advance of theory itself.
Although one frequently hears that the social sciences offer a more
rigorous way to study law than do the more traditional forms of
scholarship, I believe the reverse is true. The theoretical commitment
of most "scientific" studies of the law is weaker and more suspect,
especially in studies conducted by lawyers. Lawyers are individuals
who by their investment of many years in obtaining a legal education
have demonstrated their belief that the law and legal institutions are
uniquely important in themselves, a belief hostile to any purely scien-
tific theory. Scientific studies of legal phenomena must be regarded
with greater skepticism than studies in the underlying sciences them-
selves because the method of legal studies is most often unscientific.
Lawyers who practice social science in law schools exploit the suc-
cesses of true scientists in the underlying disciplines and ride free
on their reputation for scientific integrity. Part of Professor Posner's
work suggests an example. His production of books and articles ad-
dressing the efficiency hypothesis-however convincing-is impressive
36. See Clark, supra note 2, at 1263-65 (urging opportunism in use of social sciences).
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to us all. But imagine the submission of the same material by a junior
faculty member for promotion in any decent economics department.
On the other hand, Professor Posner has completed many scientific
papers of the highest merit.3 7 But these are unknown to the legal
profession.
The weakness of scientific studies of the legal system derives, I
believe, from both the demand for relevance and the tolerance of
relevance. In most law schools, an economist, sociologist, or political
scientist must demonstrate some talent or interest relevant to pro-
fessional training in the law. The law school not only diverts the
purely scientific interests of these theorists but corrupts them by pro-
viding incentives to redirect the scientific method toward what may
be of use in legal practice. The demand for relevance affects lawyers
as well. Lawyers whose interest in social science derives from an in-
terest in contract or antitrust law, as opposed to contract or anti-
trust behavior, cannot be theorists and cannot be counted to con-
tribute in even a supportive role to theory, except as they might
contribute to legal theory.88
More destructive of science in legal scholarship is the tolerance
of relevance. It is not uncommon for social scientists (including lawyers
only interested in social science) to be promoted to positions in law
schools on the basis of work purely derivative of some underlying
scientific discipline or on the basis of no more than collaboration
with a lawyer. It is for this reason that, with very few exceptions,
most social scientists in law schools are essentially gifted teachers of
undergraduates, and not theorists of the first rank. Before applica-
tions of the scientific method by the faculties of law schools can con-
tribute to scholarship, social scientists and lawyers interested in the
social sciences must be evaluated by their contribution to the scien-
tific disciplines themselves, rather than by the acceptance of their
work by unexpert student editors of law journals.
Personally, I believe that social science is possible and that it might
contribute to the understanding of human behavior and of related
legal phenomena. But law schools must resist the temptation to pol-
lute the scientific enterprise with concerns of relevance. One of Dar-
win's most convincing papers in support of his theory of biogeography
37. E.g., Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, I J. LEGAL STUD. 305 (1972).
38. Perhaps this is what my colleague Bruce Ackerman means by the "new doctrin-
alism." See Ackerman, The MarketPlace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131-32 (1981) (de-
scribing recent application of social science analysis to legal problems as newer version
of doctrinal analysis).
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addressed the influence of saltwater on seed growth.3 9 If Darwin had
been a faculty member of a eugenics institute, charged with training
students in the methods of artificial selection for animal breeding,
the paper would have appeared the project of a madman. Lawyers
interested in the social sciences and social scientists in law schools
are in a similar position today.
39. Darwin's findings provided evidence suggestive of the types of plants that could
be expected to survive sea transport to islands, and thus enabled the tracing of the evo-
lutionary descent of novel island species. C. DARWIN, On the Action of Sea-Water on the
Germination of Seeds, in I THE CoLLEcTE PAPRS OF CHARLES DARWIN 264 (P. Barrett
ed. 1977). The paper is discussed in M. GHISELIN, supra note 22, at 40.
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